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Abstract: This paper is devoted to issues which have not been suf-
fi ciently explored in European literature, and which have had frag-
mented consideration in comparative literature. These issues raise the 
question of whether the EU legislator should develop a framework of 
criminal law rules which would regulate the use of Artifi cial Intelli-
gence (hereinafter: AI) in the near future, and what such rules should 
specifi cally address. The authors recognise two issues of particular 
importance for the future regulation of AI development within the EU, 
and offer their perspective on the areas which should be subjected to 
regulation in this regard. In order to provide a systematic overview of 
this topic, the paper starts with a description of the recent regulatory 
action of the EU in the fi eld of AI, with special refl ection on the Ethics 
Guidelines for Trustworthy AI. The authors then describe what are, in 
their opinion, the most important intersections of AI and criminal law 
in the broader sense, and in conclusion present their views of which 
areas should be specifi cally regulated by EU legislature in this context.
Keywords: robot, Artifi cial Intelligence, criminal law, criminal proce-
dure, autonomous, sanctions, European Union.
1 Introduction
The term ‘robot’ was fi rst introduced by Czech author Karel apek in 
his renowned SF drama Rossumovi Univerzální Roboti of 1920.1 This term 
subsequently became the colloquial name for all types of devices with a 
certain level of independence in their operation. For the purposes of this 
paper, the defi nition of robot as provided by Jack Balkin will be used. Ac-
cording to Balkin, the term robot applies to ‘all material objects that in-
teract with their environment, artifi cial intelligence agents, and machine 
* The research for this paper was partly conducted within ‘Artifi cial Intelligence and Crim-
inal Law (IP-PRAVOS-18)’, a project funded by the Faculty of Law Osijek. DOI: 10.3935/
cyelp.16.2020.371.
** Associate Professor of Criminal Law at J. J. Strossmayer University in Osijek, ivuletic@
pravos.hr. ORCID iD: 0000-0001-5472-5478.
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1 See Karel Capek and Ivan Klima, R. U. R. (Claudia Novack-Jones (tr), Rossum’s Universal 
Robots edition 2004).
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learning algorithms’.2 This defi nition is adequate because it also covers 
other forms of artifi cial intelligence which do not have physical embodi-
ments in space (such as software).3 It is clear that the terms ‘robot’ and 
‘AI’ are not synonymous; certain authors have taken the position that 
AI is a broader, generic term, because robots can function by means of 
artifi cial intelligence, but not necessarily, because a robot can be a me-
chanical device, ie an extension of a human arm.4 The position of the 
European Commission speaks in favour of the position that: ‘AI-based 
systems can be purely software-based, acting in the virtual world (eg 
voice assistants, image analysis software, search engines, speech and 
face recognition systems) or AI can be embedded in hardware devices (eg 
advanced robots, autonomous cars, drones or Internet of Things appli-
cations)’.5 The European Parliament also offered a defi nition of so-called 
‘smart robots’ which implies robots which function by means of artifi cial 
intelligence with a degree of autonomy.6 For the purposes of this paper, 
we are only interested in such ‘smart robots’ which are based on artifi -
cial intelligence. The terms ‘robot’ and ‘artifi cial intelligence’ or ‘AI’ will 
be used here interchangeably as synonyms in this paper.7
Devices functioning on AI can also cause signifi cant damage to per-
sons and property, which will be described in more detail later in this paper. 
The development of artifi cial intelligence is a trend which creates 
great opportunities for progress and for enhancing the quality of life. 
There is even talk of a fourth industrial revolution or ‘Industry 4.0’, a 
phrase coined by the German government and which has enjoyed wide 
reception.8 The infi ltration of AI into various spheres of human life has 
2 Jack M Balkin, ‘2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big Data Law and Policy: 
The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data Lecture’ (2019) 78 Ohio State Law Jour-
nal 1217, 1219.
3 On the other hand, there are authors who link the term ‘robot’ exclusively to the types of 
AI which have a certain embodiment in the outside world. See, for example, Ryan Calo ‘Ro-
bots in American Law’ (2016) University of Washington School of Law Research Paper 2016-
04, 6, available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737598> ac-
cessed 20 March 2020.
4 See SunËana RoksandiÊ VidliËka, Lelde Elīna Liepiņa and Svitozar Ostapchuk, ‘Bioethical and 
Legal Challenges of Artifi cial Intelligence and Human Dignity’ in Miodra JovanoviÊ and Tibor 
Virady (eds), Human Rights in the 21st Century (Eleven International Publishing 2020) 273.
5 Commission, ‘Artifi cial intelligence for Europe’ (Communication) COM(2018) 237 fi nal, 1.
6 European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Com-
mission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)) para 1.
7 Here it must be noted that the defi nition of the term ‘robot’ can be approached from var-
ious angles. However, this will not be elaborated further, as it would go beyond the scope 
of this paper. For more on this, see, for example, Thomas Kirchberger, ‘European Union 
Policy-Making on Robotics and Artifi cial Intelligence: Selected Issues’ (2017) 13 Croatian 
Yearbook of European Law and Policy 191, 196-197.
8 ibid, 192.
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numerous advantages, because it improves the quality of the provision of 
services in various sectors to the point that there is even valid apprehen-
sion that robots might replace the human workforce in most occupations 
in the near future.9 This trend raises many concerns, among which the 
legal ones are the most signifi cant. The legal signifi cance of this phenom-
enon is best refl ected in the fact that in some European countries a sepa-
rate legal branch − the laws of robotics − is already being developed, and 
that it is being examined at academic, legislative and practical levels.10 
One of the questions which law has to answer is how to regulate 
the operation of AI in such a manner as to ensure legal certainty but 
in a way which will not hinder the development of modern technology 
and the progress of society. This topic can be approached from various 
angles: labour law, civil law, commercial law, consumer protection law, 
etc. However, the concern here is the analytical approach to this topic 
from the perspective of criminal law. It is already evident that robots are 
taking over the roles of humans, and not only in ways which are useful 
for society, but also in harmful and unwanted ways. 
If robots are imposed in addition to or as an alternative for humans 
in various occupations where there is a potential for damage, then there 
is clearly a possibility that such damage can occur when such occupa-
tions are performed by robots.
If a human driver can cause a traffi c accident, a robot can do so as 
well. What remains unclear at this point is: who bears criminal liability 
in the latter case? This issue is not limited only to the fi eld of traffi c safety, 
but also applies to other fi elds where autonomous robotic technologies are 
being introduced (the weapons industry, medicine, fi nancial operations, 
etc). Considering that the EU internal market follows global trends and is 
on track with the adoption of the modern technological trends of our time, 
there is no doubt that this issue is quite relevant in the context of EU law. 
This paper will therefore answer two questions which, in our view, have 
been disregarded up to now: are there criminal law fi elds which are ripe 
for regulation (and which specifi c fi elds are these), and  is the EU  the ap-
propriate level for the regulation of these fi elds (and what exactly should 
be regulated) and does the EU have the competence to do so? 
This paper comprises fi ve sections, with an introduction and a short 
overview of recent EU normative activities in the fi eld of AI regulation. 
9  See, eg, Daniela Rus ‘The Robots Are Coming’ (2015) 94 Foreign Affairs 2. 
10 Examples of such countries are Germany and Switzerland. For more on the situation in 
Switzerland, see, eg, Melinda Florina Müller, ‘Roboter und Recht. Eine Einführung’ (2014) 
5 Aktuelle juristische Praxis 595. For Germany, see, eg, Sabine Gleβ and Thomas Wei-
gend, ‘Intelligente Agenten und das Strafrecht’ (2014) 126 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Stra-
frechtswissenschaft 561.
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This is followed by a discussion of the intersections of AI and criminal 
law. For a clear and systematic view, this discussion is divided into the 
areas in which criminal law uses various forms of AI to assist in crim-
inal prosecution (known as ‘areas of cooperation’) and areas where AI 
can appear as the ‘perpetrator’ of criminal offences (known as ‘areas of 
collision’). The fourth section presents the views of the authors on what 
EU law should regulate in the future in this fi eld, and in what manner, 
and the fi nal, fi fth section contains concluding remarks.
2 Recent legislative activities of the EU in the fi eld of AI 
The EU has been quite active with regards to civil law rules on ro-
botics. In 2016 the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs 
submitted a Report on the civil law rules on robotics to the EU Commis-
sion. Critics welcomed the adoption of such a document and commented 
that this was a timely effort by the Parliament, not only to remain in 
tune with the times, but also to take one step further and anticipate the 
future.11 Among other things, this Report warned that the existing civil 
law framework was not suffi cient to cover all the potential damage that 
could occur through the use of AI.12 
Of course, fragmental regulation can be found in diverse documents. 
One good example of this is Directive 2016/680.13 Article 11 of the Di-
rective stipulates a prohibition of the decision based solely on automated 
processing, which is a provision that is analogous to the provision of 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation − GDPR).
The most recent regulatory act which should be mentioned is the 
Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artifi cial Intelligence (AI) (hereinafter: 
Guidelines). This document was developed by a High-Level Expert Group 
on Artifi cial Intelligence (hereinafter: AI HLEG), which was established 
by the European Commission in June 2018. The AI HLEG consisted of 52 
European experts who published the fi rst draft of this document in De-
cember of 2018. After deliberations on over 500 received comments and 
11 See, eg, Kirchberger (n 7) 195.
12 European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report with recommendations to 
the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, 2015/2013 (INL). For more on this, see, eg, 
Tjaša Zapušek, ‘ Artifi cial Intelligence in Medicine and Confi dentiality of Data’ (2017) 11(1) 
Asia Pacifi c Journal of Health Law & Ethics 109-113.
13 Directive 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by compe-
tent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.
229CYELP 16 [2020] 225-244
suggestions,14 the fi nal version was published in April 2019. It should be 
noted that this was not the only initiative of this type at the international 
level, and that there have been over 84 attempts by various international 
associations to place AI into the frame of ethical guidelines.15 The Guide-
lines are part of a broader European approach to artifi cial intelligence, 
which is refl ected in the fi nancial sector as well, through a 70% increase 
in annual investments into the innovative research programme Horizon 
2020. Therefore, the EU will invest a total of EUR 1.5 billion between 
2018 and 2020 into the development of artifi cial intelligence. This is also 
an attempt to reduce the gap in private investments in this fi eld between 
the EU on the one hand, and the US and South Korea which are current-
ly in the lead, on the other.16 Other EU documents which were adopted 
include the Declaration of Cooperation on AI17 (April 2018) and the Coor-
dinated Plan on AI18 (December 2018).
The purpose of the Guidelines is to promote reliable AI, based on 
legality, ethics and social and technical resilience, with an emphasis on 
a human-centric approach. The Guidelines determine the framework for 
the attainment of reliable AI, with the caveat that the legality of artifi cial 
intelligence is not considered.19 The Guidelines provoked strong criticism 
soon after publication, especially because they failed to address poten-
tial high-risk areas, such as AI weapons. However, the principles listed in 
the Guidelines could be regarded as ‘guidelines’ for regulation  which is 
recognised by the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology in the 
document ‘The Ethics of Artifi cial Intelligence: Issues and Initiatives’20 
(for details, see 3.2 below).
This brief overview of the recent normative action of the EU in the 
fi eld of AI leads to the conclusion that the fi eld of criminal law (in its 
broader sense, ie substance, procedure and enforcement) has been com-
pletely disregarded thus far. The following sections will describe the 
14 Luciano Floridi, ‘Establishing the Rules for Building Trustworthy AI’ (2019) 1 Nature 
Machine Intelligence 261.
15 Brent Mittelstadt ‘Principles Alone Cannot Guarantee Ethical AI’ (2019) 1 Nature Ma-
chine Intelligence 1, available at SSRN: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=3391293> accessed 20 March 2020. 
16 See Coordinated Plan on Artifi cial Intelligence ‘Made in Europe’, available at <https://
ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/artifi cial-intelligence> accessed 20 March 2020.
17 Available at <https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/communities/en/community/digitranscope/
document/eu-declaration-cooperation-artifi cial-intelligence> accessed 25 March 2020.
18 Coordinated Plan on Artifi cial Intelligence, COM (2018) 795 fi nal.
19 High-Level Expert Group on Artifi cial Intelligence, ‘Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy 
Artifi cial Intelligence (AI)’ 7-9, paras 21-30, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/
dae/document.cfm?doc_id=60419> accessed 26 March 2020.
20 European Parliament, Panel for the Future of Science and Technology, The Ethics of Ar-
tifi cial Intelligence: Issues and Initiatives, PE 634.452 − March 2020.
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fi elds considered to be signifi cant and, in this regard, adequate for future 
regulation through EU rules.
3 Areas where criminal law and AI intersect
In order to discuss the need for criminal law regulation of AI at the 
EU level, the scope of the relevant fi elds must fi rst be determined. This 
refers to the fi elds in which criminal law and AI intersect. Only based on 
such an analysis can one determine whether the level of interaction of 
criminal law and AI is signifi cant enough to merit more detailed criminal 
law regulation which would differ from the existing rules of criminal law.
A review of the literature shows that these two categories intersect 
at various points, depending on whether AI is used in a manner which is 
helpful to criminal prosecution authorities, or if it is used in a manner 
which can cause harm or other consequences to people and property. 
Here, a systematic approach has been chosen for clarity, and the pre-
sentation of these fi elds is divided into two groups: areas of cooperation 
(which implies the use of AI for the enhancement of effi ciency in criminal 
prosecution), and areas of confl ict (ie an overview of the criminal offences 
in which a form of AI can appear as the ‘perpetrator’). This includes not 
only AI systems which are already in everyday use, but also those cur-
rently at the experimental stage, and which can realistically be expected 
to be in regular use in the near future due to their strategic signifi cance. 
This analysis will also help determine the potential criminal law issues 
and future gaps related to the more active inclusion of AI in daily life.
3.1 Areas of cooperation
Scientists are currently developing and perfecting various forms of 
AI which will most likely play a role as tools to assist law enforcement 
authorities in the performance of their duties. For example, South Korea, 
which for a long time now has been trying to assert itself as the lead-
ing global force in technologies based on autonomous intelligence, has 
announced the introduction of robot prison guards in the near future. 
These robots should increase the level of security in prisons and relieve 
the burden of prison guards.21 It can be expected that, if successful, such 
technology could soon enter European prison systems as well.
Relevant literature notes the problem by which the breakthrough of 
new scientifi c technologies, under the infl uence of the development of neu-
roscience and AI systems, could undermine the essence of the right to a 
21 For details, see ‘Robot Wardens Are about to Join the Ranks of South Korea’s Prison 
Service’ (BBC News, 25 November 2011) <www.bbc.com/news/technology-15893772> ac-
cessed 27 March 2020.
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fair trial. For example, Caianiello warns that the core of modern crimi-
nal proceedings lies precisely in the fact that each party to the proceed-
ings has the right and the ability to challenge and contest the defendant’s 
claims. However, as the mentioned author rightly points out, this right in 
recent years has been quite signifi cantly limited by the new practice of the 
European Court of Human Rights since it has allowed its derogation in 
cases of overriding interests (eg preserving national security, combating 
terrorism, etc) and this right is essentially no longer absolute. Referring to 
the recent case law of Italian courts, Caianiello fears that a cultural un-
willingness to adopt new technologies, in the absence of an adequate legal 
framework, will ultimately bring into question the protection of the defen-
dant’s fundamental rights and the ‘dialectic approach to a criminal trial’.22
In discussions on the investigation of criminal offences and pro-
ceedings against perpetrators, one should bear in mind that the nature 
of criminal prosecution requires the immediate assessment of certain 
circumstances which are relevant for the further course of the proceed-
ing. The accuracy of the assessment of such circumstances often deter-
mines the fi nal outcome of the entire criminal proceedings. This applies 
especially to the preliminary stage of the proceedings (even before the 
formal initiation) when determining the existence of legal standards − 
such as reasonable suspicion − which are necessary to justify the contin-
uation of the proceeding, and which can lead to the discovery and taking 
of key evidence (such as searches of persons and premises). However, if 
such actions are performed without suffi cient grounds for suspicion or 
if this suspicion is not elaborated in an adequate manner, then this fact 
could make them illegal, thus leading to the exclusion of the collected 
evidence. This eventually affects the court’s decision, which could result 
in exoneration by the court.  
In order to avoid such a scenario, certain scientists are working on 
the design of software which could assist police to generate and logically 
connect the data relevant to the decision on whether or not to perform 
certain acts towards suspected criminal offenders. Such software en-
tails complex algorithms which analyse the relevant data and suggest 
the most logical and most likely hypothesis, which can then be used to 
determine the reasonable grounds for suspicion for the performance of 
certain acts.23
22 Michele Caianiello, ‘Criminal Process Faced with the Challenges of Scientifi c and Techno-
logical Development’ (2019) 27(4) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice 267, 269.
23 This idea is not only present in the context of criminal prosecution, but also in other 
areas. One example is the Collaborative Intelligence Spaces (CISpaces) software, which 
is being used as a tool to assist in the operation of US intelligence agencies. Available at 
<www.cispaces.org> accessed 26 March 2020. Another example is the Prototype Robotic 
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A good example of such AI software is the program that is being de-
veloped by a group of scientists from Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, 
USA. Inspired by the fact that a large number of car searches resulting 
in the discovery of drugs are declared unlawful in court (due to the ab-
sence or insuffi cient grounds for suspicion), the scientists are developing 
a special system dedicated to assisting the police in the assessment of 
suspicion.24 This system (which has not yet been named) functions in 
the following manner: after stopping a vehicle, the police offi cer verifi es 
the data on the vehicle and the driver and enters certain parameters 
which serve as indicators of suspicion that the driver is transporting 
prohibited substances. These indicators are based on an analysis of tens 
of thousands of prior court records in drug traffi cking cases and point 
to the criteria which the competent courts in these cases considered as 
being relevant for determining the legality of the search. Therefore, the 
police offi cer enters certain parameters into the system, such as: is there 
a strong smell of perfume emanating from the car (which can indicate 
that the driver wants to throw police dogs off the scent), what is the be-
haviour of the driver (is the driver nervous, is he or she sweating), is the 
car messy (which indicates a longer journey), were items removed from 
the trunk of the car which would otherwise belong there (eg the spare 
tyre − which indicates that the space was cleared for something else), 
is the offi cial description of the route different from the actual route (eg 
the vehicle was rented and registered for a trip to destination A, but was 
travelling to destination B), has the driver previously been convicted for 
a criminal offence or misdemeanour, etc. The police offi cer enters such 
data into a laptop or even a smartphone through a standardised form, 
which allows for its quick completion. Based on the received data, the 
system provides the degree of probability that the car is transporting 
drugs, which gives the police offi cer a basis for further action.25 Such a 
system carries signifi cant weight in the US due to there being an issue of 
racial bias in police conduct in some states, and this could help prevent 
racial discrimination. While this is only an experimental project at this 
stage, it is realistic to say that similar systems will become common-
place in the near future due to the advantages they bring. At that time, 
Guard which is used by the US Border Control for the surveillance of borders. India has 
also announced the use of such an autonomous system. For more details, see ‘AI Robots to 
Patrol India Border s Soon, Prototype to Come in December’ (Business Today, 2 May 2019) 
<www.businesstoday.in/technology/news/ai-robots-to-patrol-india-borders-prototype-to-
come-in december/story/342591.html> accessed 27 March 2020.
24 Arthur Crivella, Wesley M Oliver, and Morgan Gray, ‘Coding Suspicion’ (JURIX 2018), 
available at <http://ebooks.iospress.nl/volumearticle/50850> accessed 27 March 2020.
25 Arthur Crivella, Wesley M Oliver, and Morgan Gray, ‘Reducing Subjectivity and Bias in an 
Offi cer’s Analysis of Suspicion in Drug Interdiction Stops’, Proceedings of the Seventeenth 
International Conference on Artifi cial Intelligence and Law, Montreal, QC, Canada, 17-21 
June 2019, 254-255.
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an adequate legal framework will need to be developed as well, starting 
from the rules on the implementation of such systems and their mainte-
nance and use, to rules on the admissibility of evidence collected by such 
means. This could be particularly interesting in Croatia, considering the 
possibility that the country will soon fi nd itself as part of the Schengen 
Area and that it will be extremely important to prevent the entry of vari-
ous types of prohibited goods into the EU (as well as human traffi cking). 
Therefore, this fi eld merits the attention of EU law, at least in order to 
determine the basic principles of operation.  
It should be noted that US criminal courts have already used algo-
rithms in practice to assist the courts in assessing the risk of recidivism 
of defendants, which serves as one of the criteria for sentencing, ie for 
the replacement of prison sentences with alternatives, such as parole or 
community service. The sentencing process is generally considered one 
of the most controversial fi elds of criminal law, due to the existence of 
substantial differences in the sentencing policies of various courts. Al-
though this issue exists in many systems worldwide, it carries special 
weight in the US with regards to the issue of racial discrimination.26 
Therefore, some states have introduced algorithms, such as the COM-
PAS system (Correctional Offender Management Profi ling for Alterna-
tive Sanctions) in Wisconsin, which is designed to provide courts with 
a mathematical assessment of the risk of recidivism and eligibility for 
parole of the defendant. The complexity of the legal issues surrounding 
such an assessment of risk of recidivism is refl ected in the State v Loomis 
case, which made its way to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The plaintiff 
in this case (Mr Eric L Loomis) contested the consistency of the COMPAS 
system with the right to a fair trial. Loomis was denied parole on the 
basis of a COMPAS assessment, and he was sentenced to six years in 
prison, and an additional fi ve years of special supervision after the com-
pletion of his prison sentence. In his appeal to the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin, Mr Loomis claimed that COMPAS violated his due process rights 
because it used parameters which are relevant only to certain groups of 
defendants and because the methodology on which the system operates 
is kept confi dential and cannot be subjected to a critical assessment by 
the defence.27 The court ultimately rejected Loomis’ arguments and up-
held the verdict, but this case shows how the use of AI technology in the 
criminal judiciary can raise signifi cant controversial questions, some of 
which (such as the right to a fair trial) are very signifi cant in the context 
of European law as well. Considering that many European countries 
26 For more details on this, see Darrell Stefensmeier, Jeffrey T Ulmer, and John H Kramer, 
‘The Interaction of Race, Gender, and Age in Criminal Sentencing: The Punishment Cost of 
Being Young, Black, and Male’ (1998) 36(4) Criminology 763.
27 State v Eric L Loomis, Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 2015AP157-CR, 13 July 2016.
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face the issue of sanctioning disparity, it is possible that some European 
systems will, under the infl uence of the expansion of AI trends, decide 
to implement programs such as COMPAS in the future, which will also 
require adequate legal regulation. 
In the context of this discussion, we should also mention the use of 
AI systems during the interrogation of suspects. It is not always easy to 
determine whether a person is telling the truth during interrogation, even 
for experienced examiners. At the same time, this is a function of vital im-
portance for the proceedings, given that the depositions of witnesses and 
the suspect can direct or even fully determine the further course of the 
proceedings. This applies particularly to situations where there are oth-
erwise insuffi cient leads and evidence. There are certain assisting mech-
anisms that have already been used for questioning for some time now. 
The most well-known among these is of course the polygraph test, which 
is based on the recognition of certain psychological reactions by the re-
spondent to the posed questions. In more recent times, the polygraph test 
has been joined by the somewhat more precise Guilty Knowledge Test, 
which consists of the application of technologies such as electroenceph-
alography (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and 
provides for the monitoring of blood fl ow in the brain. The scans obtained 
through these methods allow the recognition of certain physiological (not 
just psychological) reactions of the brain to the posed questions. The test 
is designed to determine whether or not the respondent recognises certain 
information connected to the criminal offence. If the information is rec-
ognised, then the brain will react differently than if the information is not 
recognised, and this will be visible on the screen.28 This method is already 
in use in different parts of the world, and courts have, from time to time, 
affi rmed that a positive result in such a test can be used as evidence of 
guilt in criminal proceedings.29 A similar example exists in the EU, name-
ly in Italy. The Italian court accepted two neuroscientifi c experimental 
procedures which tested the credibility of the victim and defendant in a 
situation where there was no other evidence. The court applied the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT) and the Timed Antagonistic Response Alethiometer 
Test (TARA), on the basis of which, with the help of an expert witness, it 
concluded that the defendant was guilty of sexual harassment.30
Although the described methodology can be very effective, it creates 
signifi cant legal implications. For example, there are warnings that such 
interrogation methods violate a defendant’s right to defend themselves 
28 For more details on this, see Ciara Staunton and Sean Hammond, ‘An Investigation of the 
Guilty Knowledge Test Polygraph Examination’ (2011) 1(1) Journal of Criminal Psychology 1.
29 See eg Harrington v State, Supreme Court of Iowa, 122/01-0653, 26 February 2003.
30 Caianiello (n 22) 281.
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by remaining silent.31 It has been pointed out that such neuro-tests will 
fully replace the role of cross-examination and thus affect the nature of 
criminal proceedings in the spirit of what is called the Socratic approach 
to testimonial evidence.32 Some authors take this one step further in 
their considerations and ask whether the future development of AI tech-
nologies for the interrogation of defendants will place the legality of the 
interrogation into question if the robot decides to use illegal techniques, 
such as torture. Such authors view the development of AI in this fi eld as 
a potential severe threat to basic human rights, and they rightly raise 
the question of who will be liable in such cases, since modern criminal 
law has not taken a clear position on the liability for criminal offences 
committed by AI (for more on this, see the following sections).33 
Since the development and implementation of AI technologies in 
criminal proceedings will certainly affect the EU region, we fi nd that 
this area is signifi cant enough to merit legal regulation at the EU level, 
and the establishment of basic principles and legal (as well as ethical) 
standards in this regard. 
3.2 Areas of collision 
While the previous section reviewed the most important areas in 
which AI can be used for the discovery of criminal offences, this section 
turns to the other side of the coin: situations in which AI can appear as 
the ‘perpetrator’ of a criminal offence. The term ‘perpetrator’ is used with 
reservation, because the criminal liability of AI has not yet been adopted 
(nor is it conceivable) in modern criminal law.34 It should be noted that, 
due to the intensifying penetration of AI into various sectors, it is theo-
retically conceivable that the issue of AI as the perpetrator of a criminal 
offence will be viewed in relation to all (or at least most) criminal offenc-
es. However, we will not delve into such a deeper analysis at this point, 
but will rather focus on the areas where technologies with high levels of 
autonomy have already been introduced. 
31 Kristen Thomasen, ‘Examining the Constitutionality of Robot-enhanced Interrogation’ in 
Ryan Calo, A Michael Froomkin, and Ian Kerr (eds), Robot Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2016) 317.
32 Caianiello (n 22) 282.
33 See, eg, Amanda McAllister, who claims that in cases of torture during interrogations 
conducted by AI, there would be a separation of the mens rea (which can only be attributed 
to humans) and the actus rea (which would be attributed to AI in such cases). Amanda 
McAllister, ‘Stranger than Science Fiction: The Rise of A.I. Interrogation in the Dawn of 
Autonomous Robots and the Need for an Additional Protocol to the U.N. Convention against 
Torture’ (2017) 101 Minnesota Law Review 2554.
34 The discussion on the issue of criminal law liability of AI goes beyond the scope of this 
paper. For more on this, see Bartosz Brożek and Marek Jakubiec, ‘On the Legal Responsi-
bility of Autonomous Machines’ (2017) 25(3) Artifi cial Intelligence and Law 293. 
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Among such sectors, the transport industry holds one of the most 
signifi cant positions. Over the past several years, this sector has seen 
the intensifi ed development of systems for steering assistance which re-
duce the need for drivers to actively participate in the driving process 
and transforms them into more of a supervisor, there just to correct 
potential errors or divergence from the desired driving mode by the au-
tomobile. Thus, serial automobile production has for years now also in-
cluded assistance tools such as tempo mats with cruise control func-
tions, the function of keeping the steering wheel steady in one lane, etc. 
It can be asserted that such equipment is no longer just reserved for the 
(most) luxurious automobile models, but can be found in automobiles 
meant for the general population.35 While such automobiles are not yet in 
open supply in the EU, there are already pilot-projects in place. In some 
US states, however, it is notable that such (fully autonomous) vehicles 
participate in traffi c, and there have also been cases where such vehicles 
have caused traffi c accidents with consequences for other participants. 
This is illustrated in the next two examples. The fi rst example relates 
to a situation in Arizona, where an ‘Uber’ vehicle, which was operating 
in ‘full-autonomy mode’, failed to detect a pedestrian who was crossing 
the street in an unmarked area. The vehicle continued to drive at full 
speed and hit the pedestrian, which resulted in her death. The second 
example relates to a similar accident (a chain reaction crash) caused 
by a ‘Tesla’ vehicle, which was also driving in autonomous mode. This 
accident also resulted in the death of one of the drivers in the other au-
tomobiles.36 These cases have shown that autonomous vehicles, along 
with their undeniable advantages,37 can also be dangerous. This raises 
the question of who bears the criminal law liability for such accidents? 
Is it the driver (who is actually not the driver), the owner of the vehicle, 
the seller, the programmer, or the manufacturer? Is there shared liability 
35 This is what is known as full autonomy mode (autonomy level 4), which represents the 
highest degree of autonomy on a scale from 0 to 4 and is currently only in the experimental 
phase. It is predicted that this mode of operation will be a long-term replacement for hu-
man drivers and will thereby reduce the number of traffi c accidents. For more, see National 
Highway Traffi c Safety Administration, US Department of Transport, Preliminary Statement 
of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles, 2013, available at <www.nhtsa.gov/staticfi les/
rulemaking/pdf/Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf> accessed 30 March 2020.
36 Sam Levin and Julia Carrie Wong, ‘Self-driving Uber Kills Arizona Woman in First Fatal 
Crash Involving Pedestrian’ (The Guardian, London, 19 March 2018) <www.theguardian.
com/technology/2018/mar/19/uber-self-driving-car-kills-woman-arizona-tempe> ac-
cessed 1 April 2020.
37 The most commonly cited advantages are the removal of negative human factors, such as 
driver fatigue, slow refl exes, drunk driving, etc. They are also more precise in their reactions 
and allow for automobiles to be used by a population which would otherwise be unable to 
do so, such as the elderly, blind, deaf and other persons. For more details, see Frank Dou-
ma and Sarah Aue Palodichuk, ‘Criminal Liability Issues Created by Autonomous Vehicles’ 
(2012) 52 Santa Clara Law Review 1157, 1162. 
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among these persons? What if these subjects are legal entities in a legal 
system which does not recognise the criminal liability of legal entities? 
Finally, what can these persons do, and is there anything they can do 
to prevent their criminal liability? Different legal systems provide differ-
ent answers to these questions, and in many systems this issue has not 
been systematically discussed.38 These are complex issues which require 
a deeper analysis and assessment of the basic concepts of criminal law, 
such as the principle of guilt, the limitations of liability for negligence, 
and criminal law causality. At the same time, it is important not to frame 
criminal liability in a manner which will serve the purpose of prevention 
and social protection, but which will decelerate and hinder technological 
advances. Considering the need for the development and strengthening 
of the single EU market, with the signifi cant diversity between the crimi-
nal law systems of individual Member States, it can rightly be stated that 
this area merits regulation through an adequate directive. 
In addition, some authors point to the potential problems related to 
presenting evidence. They imagine a situation in which a partially au-
tonomous car is called as witness after a traffi c accident. Of course, such 
a ‘witness’ is in possession of a great amount of data which could have 
decisive infl uence in concluding about the existence (or absence) of the 
driver’s guilt. At the same time, such a ‘witness’ creates several still un-
resolved dilemmas: how to access such information and how to ensure 
that it is trustworthy and admitted fairly?39 
Based on the previous elaborations, the same logic can be applied to 
the medical fi eld, or more precisely to the development and introduction 
of treatment methods performed by AI systems. The use of robotics with 
a certain level of autonomy is no longer a novelty in medicine. This is 
the case particularly in certain branches of medicine, such as diagnos-
tics and surgery, where robot technologies are used to assist surgeons 
achieve a higher level of precision in their work, to prevent tremors, etc.40 
Several years ago, American scientists managed to develop a fully auton-
omous robot-surgeon system (called Smart Tissue Autonomous Robot, 
STAR), which performed independent surgery on a pig’s abdomen. STAR 
38 For more on this, see, eg, Sabine Gless, Emily Silverman, and Thomas Weigend, ‘If Robots 
Cause Harm, Who Is to Blame? Self-Driving Cars and Criminal Liability’ (2016) 19 New Crim-
inal Law Review 412. For an analysis of Croatian law in this context, see Marin MrËela and 
Igor VuletiÊ, ‘Criminal Law Facing Challenges of Robotics: Who is Liable for a Traffi c Accident 
Caused by Autonomous Vehicle?’ (2018) 68 Collected Papers of Zagreb Law Faculty 465. 
39 Sabine Gless, ‘AI in the Courtroom: A Comparative Analysis of the Machine Evidence in 
Criminal Trials’ (2020) 51 Georgetown Journal of International Law 195.
40 See, eg, David B Camarillo, Thomas M Krummel, and J Kenneth Salisbury, ‘Robotic 
Technology in Surgery: Past, Present, and Future’ (2004) 188 The American Journal of 
Surgery 2.
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performed the same procedure as a team of human surgeons who were 
operating on a different pig, and it performed better than the surgeons 
in terms of the selected method, timing and speed.41 It is important to 
emphasise that the system itself selected the most appropriate method of 
operating, based on an assessment of the collected relevant data.42 This 
raises the same questions which arose in the context of autonomous ve-
hicles: who will be liable for the health consequences of a patient if the 
system makes an error in its selection or performance? How will that 
impact on the concept of criminal liability for medical errors, considering 
the signifi cant differences which exist in this fi eld of criminal law in var-
ious states (some EU Member States provide for medical malpractice as 
a separate criminal offence and show a trend towards criminalisation, 
while other states treat medical errors as a component within the general 
offence of manslaughter and provide sanctions only for exceptional cases 
under the standard of gross negligence43)? Considering the accelerated 
development of medicine and medical technologies, especially in West-
ern Europe, it is necessary to establish certain minimal criminal law 
standards regarding causality and guilt in medicine concerning medical 
treatment with the use of autonomous systems. 
The issue of causality and guilt is linked to some criminal offences 
which are considered typical intentional criminal offences if the per-
petrators are humans. In this context, there are discussions regarding 
the development and use of autonomous weapons and the possibility 
that such weapons, due to an erroneous assessment of the target or 
the wrong selection of means, could cause (massive) consequences for 
non-military targets and thereby commit elements of war crimes. In this 
regard, one can rightly wonder whether the existing rules of command 
responsibility would be suffi cient to convict superiors or whether there 
would be no responsibility at all due to the inability to prove the guilt 
of those superiors, regardless of the potentially large number of casu-
alties. Recent military history shows that such a scenario is far from 
inconceivable. A very drastic and illustrative example can be found in 
the case of the downing of an Iranian civilian aircraft in 1988. The in-
cident occurred when the American defence system for the protection of 
ships from airstrikes confused a civilian aircraft for a military plane and 
41 See, eg, Eliza Strickland, ‘Autonomous Robot Surgeon Bests Humans in World First’ 
(IEEE Spectrum, 4 May 2016) <https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-human-os/robotics/medi-
cal-robots/autonomous-robot-surgeon-bests-human-surgeons-in-world-fi rst> accessed 23 
November 2019.
42 See University of Maryland, ‘Smart Tissue Autonomous Robot Raises the Bar on Surgery 
Precision’ (News Story, 5 April 2018) <https://bioe.umd.edu/news/story/smart-tissue-au-
tonomous-robot-raises-the-bar-on-surgery-precision> accessed 1 April 2020.
43 On this issue, see, eg, Miha ©epec, ‘Medical Error − Should It Be a Criminal Offence?’ 
(2018) 11 Medicine, Law & Society 47.
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launched counter-aviation rockets, which led to the destruction of the 
aircraft and the death of 290 passengers and crew members, for which 
none of the responsible persons were ever convicted.44 The development 
of such combat systems has continued to this day − for example, the US 
military has technologies such as the 15 Phalanx system which automat-
ically and autonomously detects, assesses, follows and destroys different 
types of missiles which are used in attacks against ships. The Israeli 
military has systems from the ‘Fire-and-Forget Weapons’ system, such 
as the autonomous aircraft ‘Israeli Harpy’ which, once launched, fi nds, 
identifi es and destroys radar transmitters on its own.45 The development 
and perfecting of autonomous weapons is set as one of the strategic goals 
of many military superpowers in the world. Considering the possibility 
of far-reaching consequences, this naturally raises the issue of criminal 
law liability and command responsibility in the context of war crimes. 
This issue is particularly signifi cant from the perspective of European 
continental systems, which mostly reject the concept of liability for ex-
cess, such as joint criminal enterprise or conspiracy, and insist on proof 
of guilt of the superior.46 Therefore, this issue should be regulated de lege 
ferenda at the EU level, which is currently a subject of discussion.47 In 
this context, it is should be noted that the aforementioned Guidelines 
are being severely criticised by a number of scientists who claim that 
the Guidelines have failed to fulfi l their main task as they do not take a 
position on autonomous weapons.48 
Aside from the elaborated issues, criminology literature recognises 
other important areas where certain AI systems can appear as perpe-
trators of criminal offences with far-reaching consequences for people 
and property. Thus, there are warnings of the possibility of abuse which 
can occur due to the involvement of AI in the fi nancial sector, especially 
through methods such as market manipulation,49 price fi xing, and col-
44 Richard Halloran, ‘The Downing of Flight 665: US Downs Iran Airliner Mistaken for F-14’ 
(The New York Times, New York, 4 July 1988) available at <www.nytimes.com/1988/07/04/
world/downing-fl ight-655-us-downs-iran-airliner-mistaken-for-f-14-290-reported-dead.
html> accessed 2 April 2020.
45 For details on this and similar technologies, see Heather M Roff, ‘The Strategic Robot 
Problem: Lethal Autonomous Weapons in War’ (2014) 13 Journal of Military Ethics 211.
46 For details on this, see Jack M Beard, ‘Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibili-
ties’ (2014) 45 Georgetown Journal of International Law 642.
47 See also RoksandiÊ VidliËka, Lelde Elīna and Ostapchuk (n 4) 281-282.
48 Stuart Russell, ‘Take a Stand on AI Weapons’ (2015) 521 Nature − International Weekly 
Journal of Science 415.
49 Market manipulation is any action and/or trade by market participants that attempts to 
infl uence market pricing artifi cially, with the intention to deceive and cause manipulative 
effects. See Michael P Wellman and Uday Rajan, ‘Ethical Issues for Autonomous Trading 
Agents’ (Noname manuscript) 4, available at <http://strategicreasoning.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/01/ethical-issues-autonomous.pdf> accessed 4 April 2020.  
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lusion.50 These methods imply the participation of an AI system which is 
designed to perform search tasks instead of people (Autonomous Trad-
ing Agent). Problems arise when such a system, with the ability to learn 
from its surroundings and received data, starts to emit information with 
the purpose of intentionally misleading the contracting party down the 
wrong path.51 Some research has shown that such AI could master tech-
niques of sending fi ctitious orders (which will never be performed) and 
concluding fi ctitious transactions, with the aim of defrauding good-faith 
third persons to gain profi t. This could occur due to the fact that the AI 
is programmed to, among other things, fi nd the most profi table business 
models. Therefore, it could probably happen that AI recognises the con-
clusion of fi ctitious transactions as the most profi table option and then 
operates accordingly. Furthermore, there can also be various types of 
illegal manipulations on the stock market, through the dissemination of 
false information on the value of shares by algorithmic trading agents.52 
All of the above raise the issue of adequate criminal law sanctions, con-
sidering that in most EU Member States economic crime is still predom-
inantly linked to persons (human beings) under the traditional concept 
of guilt53 (in such cases, primarily the intent of the perpetrator).
There are three potential models of criminal liability provided in 
literature. According to the fi rst, AI should always be treated as a mere 
tool, which entails the liability of the programmer and the producer as 
kinds of indirect offenders. According to the second one, the emphasis 
is on the negligence of persons for AI, and they will be liable if it can be 
proven that the consequences were reasonably foreseeable. According to 
the third model, which is the least likely to occur in practice, criminal 
liability will arise pursuant to the direct liability model.54  
 Consequently, there should be considerations of a common supra-
national framework at the EU level, which would enable Member States 
to direct the future development of national criminal codes in this regard 
(either through redefi ning the concept of guilt and intent, or through a 
50 Collusion is formal or explicit agreement among competitors with the purpose of earning 
greater than competitive profi ts. George A Hay and Daniel Kelley, ‘An Empirical Survey of Price 
Fixing Conspiracies’ (1979) 437 Journal of Reprints for Antitrust Law and Economics 439.
51 ibid, 14.
52 See, eg, Thomas C King, Nikita Aggarwal, Mariarosaria Taddeo, and Luciano Floridi ‘Ar-
tifi cial Intelligence Crime: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Foreseeable Threats and Solu-
tions’ (2020) 26 Science and Engineering Ethics, available at  SSRN <https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3183238 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3183238> accessed  4 April 2020.
53 A systematic overview of the criminal law regulation of fi nancial criminality in the EU 
Member States can be found in, eg, Judith van Erp, Wim Huisman, and Gudrun Vande 
Walle (eds), The Routledge Handbook of White-Collar and Corporate Crime in Europe (Rout-
ledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2015).
54 RoksandiÊ VidliËka, Lelde Elīna and Ostapchuk (n 4) 280.
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special section and the introduction of a separate criminal offence of 
abstract danger and shared liability of the manufacturer, programmer, 
seller and user of such AI systems).55
4 What issues should EU criminal law address? 
After presenting areas considered relevant in the context of regu-
lating de lege ferenda at the EU level, this section offers an overview of 
the question of which specifi c issues should be regulated by EU law and 
which direction should be taken in the development of national criminal 
law systems in this regard. The starting point is the assumption that 
the impact of EU law on national criminal law is less intensive than in 
other branches of law, primarily because of the nature of criminal law 
as a strictly national branch, which refl ects the legal tradition specifi c 
to each national system.56 Furthermore, the directives with criminal law 
content mostly regulate what is known as reversed vertical relations (in 
which the individual has duties towards the state and not the other way 
around), and therefore they exclude the possibility of direct action in 
the absence of timely implementation.57 We also acknowledge that the 
previous EU regulation in the fi eld of criminal law has been much more 
prominent in procedural than in substantive law, as well as the fact that 
regulations of substantive matters have been directed more towards spe-
cial than general sections of criminal law.58
The basic precondition for criminal law regulation of the fi elds of AI 
operation with a higher risk of harmful consequences is the amendment 
of Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). This Article regulates the areas of mutual interest which are 
of suffi cient relevance to justify intervention. The list of nine areas of 
crime (Article 83 paragraph 1 TFEU) currently provided in this article 
is exhaustive59 and there cannot be any infl uence outside this defi ned 
55 It can be noted that some national systems already provide for a considerably broad 
criminal framework, with regards to the criminal liability of the persons standing behind 
the AI, as well as the incrimination of special criminal offences of abstract endangerment. 
For more on this, see MrËela and VuletiÊ (n 38) 483.
56 Some authors advocate the adoption of a ‘European Criminal Code’ and fi nd that such a 
development is inevitable in the near future. See Helmut Satzger, International and Europe-
an Criminal Law (CH Beck − Hart − Nomos 2012) 43.
57 ibid. See also Case C-457/02 Antonio Niselli ECLI:EU:C:2004:707 para 29;  Case 80/86 
Kolpinghuis Nijmegen ECLI:EU:C:1987:431 para 13, etc.
58 This is logical, considering that the general sections regulate the basic principles and insti-
tutes, and thereby refl ect a specifi c national tradition in a greater measure than the special 
sections of criminal codes. However, there are authors who warn of the need for the harmon-
isation of the general section of criminal law at the supranational level. For more on this, see 
Andre Klip (ed), Substantive Criminal Law of the European Union (Maklu Publishers 2011).
59 See also Satzger (n 56) 74.
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scope. The preceding sections, however, show that various risks can be 
expected in fi elds such as medicine and medical criminal law, transport 
or war crimes. Therefore, the list from Article 83 paragraph 1 should be 
expanded de lege ferenda. In this sense, it would be suffi cient to add a 
formulation such as ‘criminal offences connected to autonomous intelli-
gence’ because this would cover other potentially dangerous areas which 
may not be discernible at the moment. 
It is evident from the previous elaborations that the existing ques-
tions concern substantive, procedural and enforcement law. In the sub-
stantive sense, they relate to the rules on minimal substantive stan-
dards of criminal offences which all countries should enact in order to 
protect society from the dangerous acts of AI. In the procedural sense, 
they relate to rules on the limits of admissibility in the use of specifi c AI 
systems in criminal proceedings. The rules relevant for enforcement law 
should regulate the contribution of various forms of AI in the process 
of the enforcement of prison sentences, house arrest and other prison 
alternatives, as well as monitoring  compliance with security measures 
like criminal law sanctions determined in a judgment at the end of court 
proceedings (such as restraining orders against persons or places), etc.
From the perspective of substantive law, it would be diffi cult (or per-
haps even impossible) to oblige the Member States to amend the general 
section of criminal law by adopting concepts which would allow the de-
termination of guilt outside the limits of the foreseeability of the conse-
quence, such as the common law concept of joint criminal enterprise. 
This would be unacceptable in those countries of the continental tra-
dition which are still fi rmly based on the principles of legality and guilt 
and reject any form of objective liability.60  Therefore the draft of a future 
directive should be aimed exclusively at the modifi cation of the special 
section of criminal law, by obliging the states to incriminate new forms 
of criminal offences of what would be perceived as abstract danger, for 
which criminal law protection in those occupations which include the 
use of AI systems would be extended and pulled back to earlier stages. At 
the same time, the general adoption of the concept of criminal liability of 
legal entities should be insisted on. This would create conditions for the 
adequate sanctioning of all situations where AI systems are placed on 
the general market without maximum possible measures for the control, 
protection and prevention of consequences. These would, of course, be 
blanket norms of criminal law, because they would refer to other provi-
sions to regulate each individual industry branch in this sense. Special 
attention should be given to the issue of the development and use of 
60 For details on this, see Christoph Barthe, Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE). Ein (originär) 
völkerstrafrechtliches Haftungsmodell mit Zukunft? (Duncker & Humblot 2008). 
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autonomous weapons. In this regard, modifi cation of the concept of com-
mand liability in the appropriate direction should be considered, taking 
into account the massive number of casualties which such weapons can 
cause.61 
From the perspective of procedural and enforcement law, there 
should be clear, common standards for the use of AI in these sectors. 
Particular emphasis should be placed on the need to protect human 
rights and the due process rights of suspects, as well as the mandatory 
application of all measures for the prevention of torture and other forms 
of inhumane and demeaning conduct, especially in proceedings with ar-
rested persons and detainees. It may become necessary to establish ap-
propriate standards regarding the evidentiary value of evidence collected 
by means of AI systems, with special emphasis on the issue of determin-
ing reasonable suspicion arising out of data processed by AI and which 
can be used as grounds for the continuation of the investigation process.
5 Conclusion
Artifi cial intelligence is, without doubt, a new technological force 
that is in full swing, and which will transform society and life as we 
know it. There are many advantages of such a development, starting 
with the fact that AI creates great opportunities for economic progress 
and growth, as well as for enhancing the quality of life and quality of ser-
vices, and also for reducing the harmful effects of industry, the emission 
of greenhouse gases, etc. Therefore, it is of high strategic importance for 
Europe to ‘catch up’ with the developed industries of the US and Asia. At 
the same time, it is imperative to fi nd the right approach to balance the 
broad advantages with the potential risks. In this sense, establishing an 
adequate legal framework is of key importance. 
As emphasised in the introduction, the purpose of this research was 
to answer two questions: are there fi elds in criminal law which are ripe 
for regulation and is the EU the appropriate level for this kind of regula-
tion? In our opinion, the previous analyses have proven that the answer 
to both these questions is positive. The overview of comparative litera-
ture and case law (at least in some countries) shows how AI can be (and 
already is) in close relation to both substantive and procedural criminal 
61 It should be noted here that this will by no means be an easy task, bearing in mind the 
disagreements which currently exist around certain types of command liability in the con-
text of causality and guilt (for example, the types based on the ‘Yamashita’ model). For more 
on this, see Petar Novoselec, ‘Materijalne odredbe Rimskog statuta i njihova implementacija 
u hrvatskom kaznenom zakonodavstvu’ in Ivo JosipoviÊ, Davor Krapac and Petar Novoselec 
(eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court (Narodne novine 2001). See also William A 
Schabas The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (OUP 2010).
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law. In both fi elds, there is considerable need to establish new concepts, 
since traditional ones will soon not satisfy daily requirements. We believe 
that EU law is the proper tool for supranational intervention, especially 
given that AI law (and also AI criminal law) is still in its infancy and 
therefore very suitable for harmonisation.  
The normative activity of the EU in this area is of great signifi cance, 
because it can contribute to the harmonisation of national systems and 
to the harmonised development of the single market. Naturally, while 
we are aware that such normative activity is primarily focused on the 
branches of private law, we nonetheless fi nd that it should not circum-
vent public law, and criminal law in particular. 
Based on the previous elaborations, it can rightly be concluded that 
criminal law is facing its third revolution in the course of two decades, 
where ‘revolution’ here means the modifi cation of fundamental princi-
ples, reasoning and approach to the concept of criminal offences and 
their perpetrators. The fi rst such revolution occurred with the develop-
ment and global adoption of the concept of the criminal liability of legal 
entities. The second revolution took place when criminal law developed 
completely new concepts to effi ciently respond to criminal offences which 
occur in the virtual world, which lead to the global acceptance and in-
crimination of cybernetic criminality. Both revolutions were conditioned 
by the newly developed social needs of the given moment. 
Criminal law is as dynamic as the development and progress of so-
ciety. It follows this progress and is shaped by social needs, ie the need 
for social protection. In this sense, it is important to take a clear posi-
tion regarding the development of potentially catastrophic autonomous 
technologies, such as autonomous weapons. Thus, in the inevitable next 
stage of the development of criminal law (the third revolution), it will be 
necessary to design and implement concepts that cover criminal liability 
for the acts of AI. It is important for the EU to recognise this in a timely 
manner.
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